Trouble on the Nile and the Red Sea
Relationships between nations in the Horn of Africa may be reaching a chaotic breaking point. Egypt, an important leader in Africa, has many allies among the Horn’s regional players and is leveraging them to hurt Ethiopia and push them into further negotiations. Resources and power are the main concerns for these nations with the Nile and the Red Sea being key access points to energy, agriculture and trade. A conflict over the Nile, shared by 11 nations, could cause a disastrous energy crisis.
Irrespective of their bubbling conflict with each other, Ethiopia and Egypt have both been experiencing territorial issues that have weakened their respective sovereignty. Ethiopia and its Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed engaged in a domestic conflict with insurgent groups and regional ruling parties in 2020 that caused a humanitarian crisis and starvation deaths in the Tigray region and various others. In a report published in early 2024, Lauren Ploch Blanchard of the Congressional Research Service stated, "The conflict severely strained Ethiopia’s ailing economy and damaged its international reputation and relations with donor countries." Ethiopia's people are suffering from food insecurity and drought on top of the scars of the war; around 20 million people needed food aid in 2023. In the agenda of the Ethiopian government, gaining direct access to the Red Sea is imperative; currently, they are losing $1.5 billion in port fees to Djibouti.
As for Egypt and its territorial sovereignty, Israel's control of the Rafah border with Egypt, which recently began in May of 2024, is putting a strain on their relations. Israel has accused Egypt of allowing weapons to be 'smuggled' into Palestine. In April of 2023, neighboring Sudan had internal fighting with paramilitary forces. The concern for Egypt was their stability, as they were partners in opposing Ethiopia in the Nile dispute. They also wished to prevent the Sudanese paramilitary group from allying with outside powers, such as Russia. Both conflicts have displaced tens of thousands of people into Egypt, which was already struggling economically. Prior to the reelection of President Sisi, Egypt experienced rampant inflation, with food prices soaring by 60% in 2023. This unrest sets the stage for potential protracted conflict in the region.
Failed Negotiations
Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan have been in tense and failed negotiations for control over the Nile for more than 10 years. Ethiopia’s dam is possible because Nile countries assembled and created an institution to address Egypt's unchecked power. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, built in 2011, has allowed them to leverage control of the Nile. The dam, which is predicted to be able to increase Ethiopia’s electricity production twofold, is almost done being filled. For Egypt, their control and ability to provide water for 90 to 95 percent of their population is in jeopardy. The negotiations have fallen through thus far because Ethiopia has not agreed to give Egypt a fixed amount of water access. Both nations are concerned with protecting and securing their 100 million-plus populations and their interests. Since Egypt is downstream, Ethiopia’s agreement to these negotiations is important for them.
Regional Alliances
Eritrea, who left Ethiopia in May of 1993, took their sea access with them. This is why current relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia are important. Without a sea connection, Ethiopia is unable to maximize military and economic control of the region. Somaliland, a part of Somalia that hopes to gain formal independence, has been in talks for a deal to give them sea access in exchange for international recognition. In January of 2024, a memorandum of understanding was settled for Somaliland to lease a portion of their coast to Ethiopia for 50 years. This development has caused frustration among many nations, including Egypt. Egypt has made its position known (to little consequence) in its lobbying to exclude Ethiopia from the Red Sea Council, created by Saudi Arabia in 2020. This has also put Ethiopia at odds with Somalia, whose coastline is being divided without their consent. While the agreement has yet to materialize, it has had notable real-world consequences. Egypt and Somalia’s military diplomacy has provided Somalia with arms and military airplanes at their capital. In August, the BBC reported that as many as 10,000 Egyptian soldiers are soon to be supplied to Somalia. This is on trend for the worsening relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, who were formerly allies in their fight against Al-Qaeda-related militant groups. According to the Institute for the Study of War, those same groups may incidentally gain access to the new weapon shipments.
In a parallel fashion, Egypt and Eritrea began talks regarding diplomacy and collaboration. This is in conjunction with the many other diplomacy efforts that Egypt has engaged in: Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan. This holds great significance because Ethiopia and Eritrea’s relationship of late has been one of faulty bilateral agreements and involvement in one another’s internal conflict. Their alliance was put on hold in 2018 whilst the new (at the time) Prime Minister attempted to construct amicable relations with Eritrea. Ethiopia and Eritrea worked together to ‘destabilize’ their common enemy: the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, the former ruling party of Ethiopia. Since then, the partnership has dissolved, and Egypt has been able to reemerge as a viable ally. Egypt, which has situated itself as a peace-maker between two disputing ethnic groups within Ethiopia's ethnofederalism project, — the Tigrayans and the Eritreans — has also made strides in attempting to undermine Prime Minister Abiy and his objectives. President Afwerki's partnership with Egypt against Ethiopia adds kindling to what Mohamed Khemir Omer predicted would be a proxy war in 2023. This would be built upon Ethiopia's decades of displeasure with their access to the Red Sea.
More good news has emerged from Guba for the lower Abbay basin countries. Along with the uninterrupted flow of the river, the dam's spillways have been opened, releasing an additional 2,800 cubic meters of water per second.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) plays a… pic.twitter.com/MqBg2wEgEt— Abiy Ahmed Ali 🇪🇹 (@AbiyAhmedAli) August 25, 2024
Inflammatory Statements
War has yet to occur over the moves made in the Nile and the Red Sea, but increasingly hostile statements from the countries’ leaders indicate strong discord. The makings of conflict emerge by the day.
Recently, President El-Sisi of Egypt stated, “Egypt will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia or affect its security.” In another statement that could be considered antagonistic regarding Egypt's outside role in the Ethiopian and Somalian Red Sea issue, President El-Sisi stated, "[his] message to Ethiopia is that … trying to seize a piece of land to control it is something no one will agree to." The president of Somalia, Sheikh Mohamud, added, "We will not stand idly by and watch our sovereignty being compromised.”
In response to the tensions surrounding the completion of the dam, Prime Minister Abiy of Ethiopia stated, "Anyone who plans an attack on national sovereignty should think ten times." He continued, "We will not allow them to harm us and we will humiliate anyone who dares to threaten us." To bolster these statements, the Prime Minister’s X page features a profile and banner involving the dam and its construction. Much of the page has promotional content for development projects and agricultural initiatives. Notably, some, if not all, of these projects will benefit greatly from the energy that they will produce. The dam’s importance is evident. Abiy has one message: the dam will grow Ethiopia’s economy and is to be protected.
Many of the statements directed towards Ethiopia and its officials from their Nile-sharing neighbors signal a distrust towards them and their eagerness towards this project. The United States Geological Survey states that the GERD can store water to prevent the harsh effects of future droughts, diminish the impacts of torrential rain and flooding, and furnish Egypt and Sudan with irrigation water. The USGS also confirms Egypt's fears as they express that the dam's presence can also sharply cut water supply. The great potential of this dam is difficult to ignore, but so are its cons. Ethiopia having such control over the Nile, considering its animosity towards Egypt, could be a threat worthy of note.
So, What is to Come?
Each side’s interests seem to conveniently impede the other’s future goals. While such public assertions by the leaders could be viewed as posturing, it is clear that no side is willing to budge on their agendas. Thus, we are left to surmise what impact this will have on the future of the region. While this stalemate has been ongoing, new developments ensure that negotiations will only become more precarious. This situation draws parallels to the Suez Crisis of 1956. In that instance, the ownership of the canal as a resource was what allowed major powers to cause economic and trade-halting implications.
With a vital resource like water being used for both energy and consumption, can we blame Egypt for worrying about water access? Can we blame Ethiopia for attempting to build more infrastructure? Ultimately, the answers to these questions fall squarely in the laps of the leaders and will be answered in their willingness to compromise and come to a peaceful resolution.
